

DARFURIAN VOICES

Documenting Darfurian Refugees'
Views on Issues of Peace, Justice,
and Reconciliation



A Project By 24 Hours For Darfur
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In Collaboration With:

- Res Publica
- The Darfur People's Association of New York
- The Darfur Rehabilitation Project
- The Genocide Intervention Network
- The Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School

The information provided and views expressed in this report are those of 24 Hours for Darfur alone and do not necessarily reflect those of its collaborating organizations.

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“Naivasha Agreement”)
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement (“Abuja Agreement”)
GOS	Government of Sudan
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally displaced person
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JMST	Joint Mediation Support Team
NCP	National Congress Party
OCHA	Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SLA/AW	Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid
SLA/MM	Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi
SPLM/A	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

Project Overview

Darfurian Voices is a project to systematically document the views held by Darfurian refugees in Chad on issues of peace, justice, and reconciliation. The project is structured to serve as a mechanism through which these views can be accurately transmitted to policymakers, mediators, negotiating parties, and other key stakeholders.

The project consists of two components: (1) a random-sample survey representative of the entire Darfurian refugee population living in the refugee camps in eastern Chad, and (2) in-depth interviews with tribal, civil society, and rebel leaders also living in Chad.

In May and June 2008, pilot research was conducted in N'Djamena, Abéché, and the Gaga refugee camp. Primary research was carried out in each of the 12 Darfurian refugee camps in eastern Chad from April to July 2009. A total of 2,152 refugees were interviewed. This report details their views.

Research Question

The central research question this project seeks to answer is: What do Darfurian refugees believe are the necessary conditions for a just peace in Darfur? To answer this question, we collected data on survey participants' specific beliefs about

- 1 The root causes of the conflict
 - 2 Past peace negotiations and agreements for Darfur and southern Sudan
 - 3 The nature and importance of justice in bringing about a sustainable peace, with specific focus on the role of compensation as well as different forms of justice (e.g., traditional justice, international criminal justice, etc.)
 - 4 The possibility of reconciliation
 - 5 Land-related issues
 - 6 Democracy, power-sharing, and the national elections
 - 7 Which actors, if any, among the rebel movements, traditional leadership, or others best represent their views
-

Executive Summary

Background // Between April and July 2009, 24 Hours for Darfur researchers interviewed 1,872 adult civilians in all twelve Darfurian refugee camps in eastern Chad. They also conducted in-depth interviews with 280 tribal, civil society, and rebel leaders. The civilian sample was randomly selected, stratifying on camp, gender, and ethnicity to ensure a representative sample. Several minority ethnic groups were oversampled to provide greater statistical power to explore their views. Most interviewees left Darfur in 2003 or 2004 and hail from the western regions of Darfur nearest to the Chadian border. Approximately three-quarters left Darfur after exposure to serious violence. Slightly less than three-quarters reported that at least one immediate family member died as a result of the conflict.

Conditions for Peace // Together, disarmament and the provision of security were the most commonly cited conditions for peace, followed by the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir and the unification of the rebel movements. Respondents also believed that individual victim compensation and development in Darfur were important for peace.

Commitment to Peace // Over ninety percent of refugees reported that they believed the United Nations, United States of America, and European Union were committed to peace. Nearly three-quarters of interviewees perceived the Government of Chad and the non-Arab tribal leadership in Darfur to be committed to peace. Less than one-quarter of the respondents thought that the African Union, the Government of Qatar, or the Arab League were committed to peace. Virtually no respondents reported that the National Congress Party or the Arab tribal leadership in Darfur were committed to peace.

Over eighty-five percent of the population, including roughly three-quarters of each ethnic group surveyed, viewed the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) as strongly or somewhat committed to peace. Approximately three-quarters of the population stated that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was committed to peace. In general, respondents did not have highly polarized views towards these two movements: among those who viewed the SLA/AW as strongly committed to peace, eighty percent also thought the JEM

was somewhat or strongly committed. Conversely, among those who viewed the JEM as strongly committed, over ninety percent reported that the SLA/AW was somewhat or strongly committed to peace. Only one-fifth of the population reported believing that the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi was committed to peace.

Darfur Peace Agreement // Two-thirds of respondents had heard of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), though slightly less than one-third reported that they were familiar with the DPA in detail or with its main points. The vast majority of refugees believed that the DPA was very unfair. They cited inadequate security and disarmament provisions most frequently as the agreement's greatest weakness, followed by the lack of justice provisions and inadequate compensation of victims.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement // The majority of refugees who were aware of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement believed it to be a fair agreement for the people of South Sudan. Leaders did not believe that the agreement was relevant to the people of Darfur.

Doha Peace Talks // Very few interviewees thought that the negotiations taking place in Doha, Qatar, would result in peace. Nevertheless, over three-quarters of respondents believed that all rebel groups should attend these talks.

Representation at Peace Talks // Very few refugees thought that their interests were represented in past peace negotiations. The SLA/AW, JEM, traditional leaders, leaders of refugees and internally displaced persons, civil society leaders, and the international community were all frequently mentioned as indispensable parties at future negotiations.

The Darfur Rebellion // Nearly all respondents believed that the Darfur rebellion was justified. According to most, rebel disunity was a major obstacle to peace. Refugee leaders attributed the lack of unity to self-interest and greed on the part of rebel leadership, government manipulation of rebel groups, and group division along tribal lines.

Responsibility for Violence // Nearly all respondents attributed a degree of responsibility for the violence that has occurred in Darfur to the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed. Only twenty percent of respondents attributed any responsibility for the violence to rebel groups. When asked whom they believed was most responsible for the violence, over eighty percent of respondents answered the Government of Sudan or President Bashir. Just under twenty percent assigned primary responsibility to the Janjaweed.

Reconciliation and Accountability // Over three-quarters of the population believed that reconciliation between the tribes of Darfur was possible. A slight majority of respondents strongly or somewhat believed that it was impossible for former enemies to live together after a war. Women were substantially more likely than men to reply this way. More than half of respondents thought that tribes whose members committed crimes in Darfur bear collective responsibility. About one-third believed that only the individuals who committed crimes should be held responsible. Women were also substantially less likely to say that they could imagine ever living peacefully with members of the Janjaweed or with tribes from which the Janjaweed came.

Justice // Nearly all respondents reported that perpetrators of violence should be held accountable through criminal trials. Over ninety percent of respondents believed that such trials must occur in international courts. There was virtually no support for amnesty, even for low-level combatants.

Traditional Justice // Nearly ninety percent of interviewees considered traditional justice mechanisms to be very important for enabling the people of Darfur to live together in peace. However, almost no respondents believed that these mechanisms would be sufficient on their own for dealing with the crimes that have occurred during the current conflict. The most common reason for this given by leaders was that traditional mechanisms were never meant to deal with crimes of this magnitude. The second most common reason was that these mechanisms were meant only to address disputes between tribes or between individuals and not between tribes or individuals and the government.

International Criminal Justice // Over three-quarters of refugees had heard of the International Criminal Court (ICC), although most of those who had heard of it claimed not to know very much about what the court does. Virtually all respondents believed that President Bashir should be tried at the ICC. Moreover, approximately eighty-five percent of respondents believed that pursuing justice now through the ICC would not endanger the prospects for peace.

Compensation // Virtually all respondents stated that victims deserved to be compensated for their losses during the conflict. Respondents strongly agreed that this compensation should be given directly to individuals and should come in the form of money. Compensation should also be given to communities in the form of health and education projects.

Land and Livelihood // Most interviewees were farmers in Darfur and were unemployed at the time of the survey. Almost everyone wanted to return to his or her land in Darfur, most often citing the cessation of violence as the critical condition for return. A minority of respondents supported giving or sharing land with landless Darfurian tribes. There was a widespread belief that tribes considered by respondents to have come to Darfur from elsewhere in search of land should be made to leave.

Elections // About two-thirds of the population was aware of the elections that were scheduled for Sudan. Almost no respondents believed that these elections would be fair or would allow their interests to be represented.

Recommendations // Policy recommendations based on the survey results are found on page 41.

BACKGROUND INFO

AN OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY

Survey Administration | Interviews were administered face-to-face at each participant's place of residence. Interviews were conducted in either Arabic or one of the local languages, generally Fur, Zaghawa, or Massalit. Interviewers recorded participants' responses on the printed survey instrument.

Participant Selection | In this report we present results from two different population samples: a random sample of camp residents ("civilians") and a non-random sample of leaders ("leaders").

The civilian sample consisted of persons aged eighteen or over who were randomly selected in each of the 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad, using a stratified random sampling approach. As such, it was representative of the adult refugee population in the camps. The civilian sample size was 1,872. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics attributed to respondents, interviewees, or participants refer to the civilian sample.

The leader sample consisted of tribal, civil society, and rebel leaders, who were given a more in-depth survey than the one administered to civilians. The leader survey included additional open-ended questions as well as all the same questions as the civilian survey. Participants in the leader survey were not randomly selected. Leaders were drawn from a combination of a sample of convenience and from an effort to interview the *sheikh* of every block in each refugee camp. Consequently, the leader sample cannot be said to be representative of the leadership population as a whole. The leader sample size was 280, including 250 refugee leaders who were interviewed in the camps as well as 30 rebels and rebel leaders who were interviewed outside the camps. The data collected from the 30 leaders and rebels interviewed outside the camps were used for qualitative purposes, but are excluded from the leader statistics computed and presented in this report. Statistics drawn from the leader sample will always be explicitly attributed to leaders.

Our results are not representative of the population of Darfur as a whole. They are representative only of the adult population of Darfurian refugees residing in the 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad.

Oversampling and Weighting | We sampled an approximately equal number of men and women. However, there were more women than men in the refugee camps. We thus oversampled men, meaning that men were over-represented in our sample as compared to the actual population. We also intentionally oversampled ethnic groups that represented more than one percent of the population but had few people in the camps relative to other groups so that we would have sufficient numbers to make meaningful comparisons between groups.

For our results to be representative of the population as a whole, we corrected for this oversampling by means of a weighting procedure. Briefly, individuals from groups that were over-represented in our sample (such as men and ethnic minorities) were given weights of less than one, and those from groups that were proportionally under-represented in our sample (such as women) were given weights greater than one. As a result, the weighted number of observations in each subgroup of

gender, ethnicity, and camp was proportional to the size of these groups in the actual population. Data on leaders were always analyzed separately from data on civilians and were never weighted. For detailed information on the weighting and oversampling procedure, please refer to the Methodology Appendix.

Graphs and Tables | Graphs and tables in this report present results from the civilian sample unless otherwise noted. With the exception of graphs of sample demographics and leader results, all graphs present results that were weighted to reflect proper gender and ethnic proportions in the population as a whole. Graphs generally present responses as a percentage of the number of respondents who answered the question. Some questions permitted multiple responses, in which case the value on the graph represents the probability that a respondent gave that particular response.

The graphs show the sample size (n) calculated by two methods: one that counted individual respondents without weighting and one that counted the weighted number of respondents in each group. The unweighted value appears in parentheses following the weighted value. In both cases, n represents the number of participants who were asked the question. Some graphs also show the number of respondents who did not offer a response to the question. These are labeled NR, with the unweighted value appearing in parentheses following the weighted value.

The "error bars" shown on many bar graphs indicate the 95% confidence intervals around each estimate. That is, if we were to conduct our survey many times, drawing a fresh sample from the population of interest each time, we expect that 95% of the time the estimated response would fall within the boundaries of this confidence interval.

For a more detailed explanation of the survey administration and analysis methodology, please see the Methodology Appendix.

Results

I. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The population we sampled was the population of adult Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad. At the time we began sampling, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] placed the total population of Darfurian refugees living in the 12 refugee camps at 249,744.¹

Our sample consisted of 2,152 people, including 1,872 refugee civilians and 250 tribal and civil-society leaders residing in the camps, and 30 rebels and rebel leaders outside the camps. All leader statistics quoted in this report refer exclusively to the leaders interviewed inside the camps. Unless leaders are explicitly mentioned, all statistics in this report refer to the civilian sample alone.

A nearly equal number of male [51%] and female [49%] civilians were interviewed. 73% of the tribal and civil society leaders interviewed were male. All rebels and rebel leaders interviewed were male. After weighting the civilian data to account for oversampling of men [who were a minority in these camps] and several ethnic minorities, the effective probability of being sampled was equal for all adult refugees in the camps. For details of the sampling method and corrective weights, see the Methodology Appendix.

All respondents were at least 18 years of age. The ethnic breakdown of civilians was as


follows: Zaghawa [653], Massalit [609], Fur [199], Misseriya Jebel [103], Erenga [102], Dajo [99], Tama [82], and other [25].

79 % of men and 47% of women had attended some form of school or religious school. 14% of men [21% of male leaders]


and 5% of women [12% of female leaders] had attended some secondary school.

The vast majority of interviewees left Darfur in 2003 [47%] or 2004 [40%]. On average, men left slightly earlier than women.


What is your ethnicity?



What level of education have you completed?



In what year did you leave Darfur?



BACKGROUND INFO

ETHNICITY OF DARFURIAN REFUGEES IN CHAD

The Darfurian refugee camps in eastern Chad are home to dozens of ethnic groups. Below is some background information on the seven groups that make up at least 1% of the refugee population.

FUR // The Fur are Darfur's largest ethnic group, representing around one-third of the population in Darfur. The Fur are the founders of the Darfur Sultanate, which was an independent political unit from circa 1650 until 1916, when the British incorporated it into Sudan. "Dar Fur" means homeland of the Fur in Arabic, but the sultanate was a multi-ethnic state.

The Fur heartland lies in the volcanic, mountainous Jebel Marra area of central Darfur. The tribe expanded considerably during the sultanate, moving into the lowlands toward the rich, arable lands of southwestern Darfur to the borders of present-day Chad and Central African Republic.

Because of their geographic location and the relatively small number of Fur in Chad (mostly in Dar Fongoro, Chad's remote southeastern corner), most of the Fur population displaced by the conflict took refuge in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Darfur or the rebel stronghold of Jebel Marra. The small minority who fled to Chad as refugees are concentrated primarily in the southernmost camps of Goz Amir and Djabal.

ZAGHAWA // The Zaghawa, who call themselves the Beri, straddle the border between Chad and Darfur, Sudan. Their original homeland, Dar Zaghawa, lies in the northern Sahel at the edge of the Sahara desert. They live primarily as transhumant pastoralists and millet farmers. A number of successive droughts, in particular in the 1970s and 1980s, pushed many toward more fertile South Darfur. There they thrived as farmers, herders, and traders until the outbreak of the current conflict and their subsequent displacement.

A minority in both Chad and Darfur, the Zaghawa now play a key role in both areas. Notably, Zaghawa tribesman Idriss Déby took power in Chad in 1990 and still controls the country today.

Though some have remained in their original areas throughout the conflict, many Zaghawa found their way to IDP camps inside Darfur and refugee camps across the border in Chad. Those in the refugee camps hail primarily from the western edge of Dar Zaghawa, closest to the border. The Zaghawa are the majority in the six northernmost camps: Ouré Cassoni, Iridimi, Touloum, Am Nabak, Mile, and Kounoungo.

MASSALIT // The Massalit are spread across the Sudan-Chad border, centered at El Geneina, the West Darfur state capital. The Massalit established their own sultanate at the end of the nineteenth century after the first conquest of the Dar Fur Sultanate by the Turko-Egyptians.

The Massalit Sultanate still survives today. Their home areas in western Darfur experienced heavy violence during the present conflict, over the course of which many Sudanese Massalit crossed the border into Chad seeking refuge. They are the majority group in the six southernmost refugee camps: Gaga, Treguine, Bredjing, Farchana, Djabal, and Goz Amir.

DAJO // The Dajo are widely believed to be the founders of the first "state" in Darfur, before the Fur Sultanate, as early as the thirteenth century. They are sedentary farmers and their language indicates a Nubian origin. Their kingdom was situated around present-day Nyala in South Darfur, an area still home to Sudan's main Dajo community. Some other Dajo communities reside in West Darfur, to the east in Kordofan and, above all, eastern Chad.

After the collapse of their kingdom, the Dajo scattered along an east-west axis. In the eighteenth century they revived their sultanate in Dar Sila, a remote area bordering the rival Darfur and Ouaddaï sultanates. This sultanate still exists today in southeastern Chad with Goz Beida as its capital. The present conflict in Darfur displaced a few thousand Dajo, who fled to the areas of their Chadian kin around Goz Beida. They reside in the two refugee camps in Dar Sila, Djabal, and Goz Amir.

TAMA // Just south of Dar Zaghawa and north of Dar Massalit, straddling the Chad-Sudan border, live several small ethnic groups of the Tama language family. The Tama are sedentary farmers and live mostly in Chad, where they hold a sultanate around Guéréda. There are also several small Tama communities in Sudan, in particular around Saref Omra and Kebkabiya in North Darfur. Several thousand Tama from these areas took refuge among their Chadian kin in Dar Tama. They constitute a minority among Darfurian refugees, living in Mile and the most ethnically diverse camp, Kounoungo.

ERENGA // North of El Geneina in West Darfur live two other small Tama-speaking groups: the Erenga and Misseriya Jebel. The Erenga reside around Sirba and Abu Surug, where they are sedentary farmers. They have been successively part of the Darfur and the Massalit sultanates. Like the Zaghawa, their area faced repeated droughts that pushed many to settle in South Darfur. They have experienced mass displacement to camps in Darfur and eastern Chad, to the Kounoungo refugee camp, as well as to the Birak area, where they have not been officially registered as refugees.

MISSERIYA JEBEL // The Misseriya Jebel live as sedentary farmers around the small but relatively wealthy Jebel Mun massif. Also called Mileri or Mun, they constitute the most striking example of the fluidity of Arab and non-Arab identities. They claim to descend from Arabs of the Misseriya branch (one of the largest Arab tribes in both Sudan and Chad) as well as from non-Arab Tama, and still speak Milerinkiya, a language related to Tama. Like the Erenga, they have been successively part of the Darfur and the Massalit sultanates.

During the present conflict, Jebel Mun has been a stronghold of both the SLA and JEM. The area has been attacked repeatedly by government forces. Civilians have also suffered from clashes between the rebel groups and the local militias. The Misseriya Jebel have been massively displaced to Chad, where they live primarily in the Kounoungo refugee camp, as well as in the Birak area, where they have not been officially registered as refugees.

¹ This figure was provided to us in May 2009 by the UNHCR in Chad.

II. LIVELIHOODS

Respondents were asked what they did to sustain their life before leaving Darfur and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. The most common responses were farmer [91%], herder [18%], merchant [10%], and teacher/military/government official/other [5%].

Most interviewees [75%] were unemployed at the time of the survey. A small percentage were teachers [7%], aid workers [6%], or merchants [3%], or did agricultural work outside the camp [6%] or inside the camp [5%]. Women [83%] were more likely than men [63%] to be unemployed. Civilians [75%] were more likely than leaders [57%] to be unemployed.

Only a small minority [6%] of respondents reported receiving money from family or friends who lived outside the refugee camp.

III. EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE

Nearly all respondents were exposed to serious violence while in Darfur. 74% of interviewees [81% of men; 67% of women] left Darfur because of immediate violence that they personally experienced and 21% [15% of men; 26% of women] left because

of fear of future violence. 91% had all of their property and possessions stolen or destroyed. 32% [37% of men; 28% of women] had personally suffered physical violence in an attack related to the conflict.

72% of all respondents reported that at least one member of their immediate family was killed in the conflict; the median number of family members killed was 4.² 90% personally witnessed attacks on family members.

IV. ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENCE

Each interviewee was asked what he or she believed were the root causes of the conflict and was allowed to volunteer multiple responses. 87.5% cited either President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, the National Congress Party [NCP], the government, or some combination of these, as the primary causes of the conflict. Also cited were the Janjaweed [54%], Arabs [36%], bandits [17%], racism/discrimination [17%], introduction of modern weapons [8%], political marginalization [8%], a culture of violence [7%], economic marginalization [6%], and rebel groups [4%]. Only 2% mentioned conflict between

nomads and farmers, and less than 1% mentioned desertification, resource scarcity, or drought.

Respondents were asked to rank the three most important root causes of the conflict. As the most important root cause, 29% named President Bashir, 21% said the government, 14% said Janjaweed, 12% said Arabs, and 6% said banditry.


V. PEACE IN GENERAL TERMS

Interviewees were asked what peace meant to them and were allowed to volunteer multiple responses. The most common responses were security/cessation of violence [51%], the signing of a peace agreement [17%], the implementation of justice [16%], reconciliation [15%], the delivery of compensation [15%], being able to return home [14%], and development [10%].

The majority of respondents [66%] either strongly or somewhat disagreed with the statement that peace is not possible to achieve in Darfur. Members of certain ethnic groups were more likely to strongly or somewhat believe that peace is not possible [Fur 48%, Massalit 46%, Erenga 33%, Tama 31%, Dajo 26%, Zaghawa 24%, Misseriya Jebel 13%].

How many of your immediate family members (parents, siblings, spouses, children) were killed in attacks related to the current conflict? [SEE FOOTNOTE 2]


N=1702(1704)
NR=29(22)



When we talk about the root causes of the current conflict in Darfur many people have different opinions about what they are. What do you believe are the root causes of the conflict?*

* Open ended question
Multiple responses permitted

N=1808(1810) NR=30(28)



BACKGROUND INFO

WHO ARE THE JANJAWEED

Janjaweed is the most common name for the proxy militias the Sudanese government has supported and sent against the Darfuri rebels since 2003. The Janjaweed are accused of being responsible for much of the violence inflicted on civilians during the conflict.

The Janjaweed were mostly, but not exclusively, recruited from Arab tribes. However, many Arab tribes did not join the Janjaweed. Notably, the main land-holding cattle-herding tribes remained largely neutral. The militias were mostly recruited from among the camel herders, nomads whose leaders historically did not rule a *dar* (territory) in Darfur.

The Janjaweed were often incorporated into paramilitary forces, in particular the Difa ash-Shabi (Popular Defense Forces), the Harass el Hodud (Border Guard), and the Alihtiyate Almarkazi (Central Reserve Police). Many were and remain local militias under the leadership of traditional leaders, or agids (traditional war leaders), and are often mobilized temporarily for attacks in their specific area.

After the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006, many of these groups felt their interests had not been represented during the negotiations between the government and rebels. Increasingly autonomous from the government, many groups began to fight among themselves; others entered into negotiations with rebel groups, with some eventually joining the rebels.

International forces should disarm the Janjaweed and the National Congress Party.



Refugee Leader
FARCHANA CAMP

² While collecting data from the fourth [of 12] camps, we discovered an ambiguity in the Arabic wording of the question regarding the number of family members killed in the conflict. In English, the question read: “How many of your immediate family members (parents, siblings, spouses, children) were killed in attacks related to the current conflict?” In Arabic, the parenthetical statement was accidentally omitted. To correct for this, we inserted the parenthetical statement and re-trained all interviewers. An ad hoc comparison showed that the mean number of family members killed did appear to differ significantly between the first four and last eight camps [$p < 2 \times 10^{-6}$]. Therefore, all figures presented in this report regarding the number of family members killed in the conflict does not include data from the first four camps: Gaga, Farchana, Bredjing, and Treguine.

Anyone who did not strongly agree with the statement that peace is not possible to achieve was asked to articulate the three most important conditions for realizing peace. Among the most important conditions, 42% of responses were security-related [15% said disarmament, 14% said security, 8% said cessation of violence, 4% said international troops], and 22% were justice-related [16% said the arrest or prosecution of President Bashir, 6% said arrest and prosecution of criminals]. While very few respondents mentioned development [2%] or compensation [5%] as the most important conditions for peace, 13% cited development and 24% cited compensation as the second or third most important conditions. Democracy or elections were almost never mentioned as an important condition for peace [0.1% named them most important, 0.4% second most important, 0.7% third most important].³

Respondents were asked to state whether, and to what extent, they believed that certain groups were committed to peace in Darfur. The United Nations [97%], the United States [97%], the European Union [92%], the Government of Chad [85%], non-Arab tribal leadership [69%], and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

[SPLM/A] [60%] were viewed as strongly or somewhat committed to peace by the majority of those interviewed. Conversely, very few respondents felt that the African Union [28%], the Government of Qatar [25%], the Arab League [10%], or the Arab tribal leadership in Darfur [5%] were committed to peace. Virtually no one [3%] believed that the NCP was committed to peace.

When asked about rebel groups in general, women [67%] were more likely than men [57%] to believe that rebel groups in general were committed to peace.

The vast majority of respondents perceived the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid Mohamed Alnour [SLA/AW] to be strongly committed [77%] or somewhat committed [9%] to peace. Notably, SLA/AW was perceived to be strongly or somewhat committed to peace by more than 80% of each ethnic group that constitutes more than 1% of the population of the refugee camps in eastern Chad, including the Erenga [97%], Fur [94%], Dajo [94%], Massalit [90%], Misseriya Jebel [89%], Tama [85%], and Zaghawa [81%].

The Justice and Equality Movement/Khalil Ibrahim [JEM] was also seen as strongly

committed [63%] or somewhat committed [12%] by a strong majority of those interviewed. Notably, a considerably smaller proportion of the Fur tribe [44%] believed that the JEM was strongly or somewhat committed to peace.

In general, respondents did not have highly polarized views towards these two movements: among those who viewed the SLA/AW as strongly committed to peace, 80% also thought the JEM was somewhat or strongly committed. Conversely, among those who viewed the JEM as strongly committed to peace, 93% reported that SLA/AW was somewhat or strongly committed to peace.

SLA/Unity was perceived to be strongly or somewhat committed to peace by 58% of the population.

A minority [21%] of the population viewed the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi [SLA/MM] as strongly or somewhat committed to peace. Members of the Zaghawa tribe were slightly more likely [30%] to perceive SLA/MM as committed to peace.

“

It is the government that armed the Arab tribes and it is the government that must take back the weapons.

Refugee Leader
DJABAL CAMP

”


³ We report respondents' understandings of democracy and attitudes towards it below in Section VIII.

Many people have different opinions about how peace can best be achieved in Darfur. In your opinion, what are the three most important things that need to happen for peace to be achieved?*

* Open ended question


First Most Important Condition for Peace

N=1402(1428)




Second Most Important Condition for Peace

N=1323(1357)



Third Most Important Condition for Peace

N=1044(1093)




Now I am going to read a list of different groups that have participated, or may participate, in the peace process. For each one, tell me if you think they are strongly committed to achieving peace, somewhat committed, somewhat not committed, or strongly not committed to achieving peace in Darfur.

		Strongly committed	Somewhat committed	Somewhat not committed	Strongly not committed
National Congress Party	N=1675(1664) NR=192(204)	3	1	2	95
SPLA/M	N=1528(1525) NR=334(339)	41	20	9	31
Rebel groups	N=1557(1536) NR=242(266)	50	19	8	24
JEM/Khalil	N=1690(1681) NR=166(176)	63	12	6	20
SLA/Minni Minnawi	N=1683(1681) NR=175(177)	16	6	5	73
SLA/Abdul Wahid	N=1709(1719) NR=143(136)	77	9	3	11
SLA/Unity	N=1245(1215) NR=598(625)	43	15	6	36
Non-Arab tribal leadership	N=1679(1680) NR=178(177)	56	13	5	26
Arab tribal leadership	N=1735(1731) NR=125(130)	3	2	4	91
African Union	N=1583(1587) NR=278(275)	20	7	9	64
United Nations	N=1775(1777) NR=90(89)	93	4	1	2
United States	N=1773(1775) NR=93(92)	92	4	1	2
European Union	N=1641(1642) NR=225(225)	86	5	1	7
Arab League	N=1627(1627) NR=232(232)	8	2	2	88
Chad	N=1670(1754) NR=97(102)	72	13	5	9
Qatar	N=1350(1346) NR=502(506)	16	9	7	68

VI. PEACE AGREEMENTS AND PEACE PROCESSES

The majority [67%] of respondents had heard of the Darfur Peace Agreement [DPA], including 87% of men [99% of male

Many people have different opinions about whether the Darfur Peace Agreement/Abuja Agreement was fair for the people of Darfur. Do you think that the agreement was ...?*




[7%] Very fair
 [4%] Somewhat fair
 [5%] Somewhat unfair
 [84%] Very unfair

N=1218(1240) NR=82(83)

leaders] and 50% of women [75% of female leaders].

Of those who had heard of the DPA, a very small minority were familiar with the details of the agreement [9% of men, 13% of

What specifically (about the Darfur Peace Agreement/Abuja Agreement) do you feel was unfair?*



N=978(1013) NR=74(80)

* Open ended question
 Multiple responses permitted


male leaders; 4% of women, 11% of female leaders] or the main points of the agreement [23% of men, 29% of male leaders; 13% of women, 9% of female leaders].

Of those who were familiar with the DPA, 84% believed the agreement to be very unfair for the people of Darfur. Interviewees were asked what specifically they thought was unfair and were allowed to volunteer multiple responses. Inadequate security [45%] and disarmament [43%] provisions were most frequently mentioned as the agreement's biggest weaknesses. Also mentioned as reasons the agreement was unfair were lack of justice provisions, especially criminal trials [36%], and inadequate compensation [36%], development [22%], power-sharing [19%], and wealth-sharing [17%] provisions. Interviewees also perceived the agreement to be unfair because it was signed only by SLA/MM [4%], because refugees/ internally displaced persons [IDPs] were still living in camps [4%], because it was never implemented [3%], and because the killing had not stopped [3%].

Now I am going to read a list of different groups that have participated, or may participate, in the peace process. For each one, tell me if you think they are strongly committed to achieving peace, somewhat committed, somewhat not committed, or strongly not committed to achieving peace in Darfur.


JEM/Khalil

		Strongly committed	Somewhat committed	Somewhat not committed	Strongly not committed
Fur	N=62(182) NR=6(17)	34	10	12	44
Zaghawa	N=773(616) NR=43(37)	70	7	5	18
Massalit	N=715(542) NR=90(67)	55	18	7	21
Erenga	N=23(87) NR=4(15)	88	2	0	9
Dajo	N=25(93) NR=2(6)	82	6	5	6
Misseriya Jebel	N=44(93) NR=4(10)	76	13	2	9
Tama	N=24(63) NR=10(19)	73	12	1	13




SLA/Minni Minnawi

		Strongly committed	Somewhat committed	Somewhat not committed	Strongly not committed
Fur	N=66(191) NR=3(8)	39	25	4	89
Zaghawa	N=771(614) NR=47(39)	23	7	4	66
Massalit	N=707(535) NR=102(74)	11	5	7	77
Erenga	N=22(84) NR=5(18)	12	0	5	83
Dajo	N=24(91) NR=2(8)	4	4	5	87
Misseriya Jebel	N=45(94) NR=4(9)	7	1	6	86
Tama	N=25(64) NR=9(18)	11	2	1	85




SLA/Abdul Wahid

		Strongly committed	Somewhat committed	Somewhat not committed	Strongly not committed
Fur	N=68(196) NR=1(3)	88	6	2	4
Zaghawa	N=758(608) NR=56(45)	71	10	3	15
Massalit	N=736(560) NR=69(49)	81	10	3	7
Erenga	N=24(90) NR=3(12)	94	3	0	3
Dajo	N=25(95) NR=1(4)	88	5	2	4
Misseriya Jebel	N=48(99) NR=2(4)	87	2	3	7
Tama	N=26(66) NR=8(16)	76	9	3	12



SLA/Unity

		Strongly committed	Somewhat committed	Somewhat not committed	Strongly not committed
Fur	N=41(196) NR=26(3)	30	10	1	4
Zaghawa	N=568(608) NR=246(45)	49	10	4	37
Massalit	N=539(560) NR=260(49)	37	22	8	34
Erenga	N=14(90) NR=13(12)	60	6	5	29
Dajo	N=16(95) NR=10(4)	56	18	8	18
Misseriya Jebel	N=29(99) NR=19(4)	52	8	2	39
Tama	N=20(66) NR=14(16)	43	6	5	46



BACKGROUND INFO

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, commonly referred to as the Naivasha Agreement, was signed on January 9, 2005, by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. The agreement marked the end of the two-decade-long Second Sudanese Civil War. The bilateral accord outlined a six-year interim period to settle disputes over resources, power, the role of religion, and southern self-determination that have persisted since Sudanese independence. The interim period was designed to make unity attractive to the parties, culminating in a democratic national election and referendum on self-determination for the people of southern Sudan.

The Naivasha Agreement outlined comprehensive security, wealth-sharing, and power-sharing provisions while addressing the controversial status of oil-rich Abyei and other "transitional areas" of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The parties agreed to form a Government of National Unity and to establish a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan. They also committed to reconfiguring the distribution of national wealth, particularly petroleum revenue. To build trust between the parties and guarantee stability, both sides agreed to the cessation of hostilities and to the reorganization and redeployment of the armed forces.

Since the signing of the agreement, there has been no return to large-scale armed conflict. Nevertheless, there have been difficulties with implementation, most notably a lack of transparency in wealth-sharing, an inconsistent national census, and a disputed electoral process. Nearing the conclusion of the interim period, the parties have yet to agree on a recognized north-south border or the status of the transitional areas. The referendum on southern self-determination is scheduled for January 2011.

BACKGROUND INFO

THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), commonly referred to as the Abuja Agreement, was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 5, 2006, by the Government of Sudan and one rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi. Notably, the two other main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid and the Justice and Equality Movement, rejected the agreement.

Modeled in part after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the DPA focused on issues of power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security. Power-sharing provisions included guaranteed political representation for rebel signatories, including representation in the National Assembly, State Legislature, and State Ministries. Wealth-sharing provisions included funds for reconstruction and compensation. Security provisions included the disarmament and demobilization of government militias and the integration of rebel groups into the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The groups that did not sign the agreement demanded, among other things, more compensation for victims and a clearer commitment on the part of the government that wealth would be transferred to Darfur. They insisted on greater representation in national and state legislatures, an additional vice-presidential post to be filled by a Darfuri, greater participation in supervising the disarmament of militias, and an increased role in the state's security institutions.

The African Union–led negotiation was characterized by deep mistrust between the parties, as well as by the lack of a unified position among the rebel factions. The process itself was criticized for, among other things, being rushed to meet an artificial deadline set by the international community and for not including civilian or civil-society representation. Moreover, the widespread perception that the agreement has not been implemented has been the source of great frustration among its intended beneficiaries.

A majority of men [80%] but a minority of women [44%] had heard of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA]. Of those who had heard of the CPA, the majority [68%] believed that the agreement was very or somewhat fair for the people of South Sudan. Leaders were asked why the agreement was fair. The most common response was that it gave the south a proportional share of wealth and political power; the fact that South Sudan was given the right to self-determination was also mentioned. Those leaders who did not believe that the CPA was fair explained their opinion by stating either that the agreement was not implemented or that fighting continued in Abyei.

BACKGROUND INFO

THE DOHA PEACE TALKS

The Government of Qatar–hosted peace talks commenced in Doha, Qatar, in February 2009 between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Justice and Equality Movement. The talks are ongoing and are being mediated by the African Union/UN Joint Mediation Support Team. The JEM withdrew from negotiations in March 2009 following the GOS expulsion of aid groups from Darfur in response to the International Criminal Court arrest warrant issued against President Bashir.

Negotiations between the JEM and the government restarted nearly a year later with the signing of a framework agreement in February 2010 that pledged power- and wealth-sharing, restitution for victims, a two-month ceasefire, and the release of JEM prisoners. However, talks yielded no significant results by the deadline set just before the national elections. In early 2010, negotiations commenced between the newly formed Liberation and Justice Movement and the GOS and ran parallel to JEM negotiations in Doha. As of June 2010, the JEM had withdrawn from all negotiations.

Leaders were asked whether they thought that the transitional political process laid out by the CPA, which included national elections, would have any effect on Darfur. The overwhelming majority stated that it would have no effect on Darfur. The general perception was that the CPA was an agreement between the NCP and SPLM and did not concern Darfur.

The vast majority of men [77% of civilians, 92% of leaders] and a minority of women [41% of civilians, 68% of leaders] had heard of the round of peace negotiations taking place at the time of the survey in Doha between the Government of Sudan and the JEM. Of those who had heard of the Doha talks, only 18% of men [10% of leaders] and 32% of women [22% of leaders] believed that the negotiations would result in peace.

Leaders were asked whether the transitional political process outlined in the CPA, which provided for temporary power-sharing in state and national government followed by democratic elections, would affect Darfur. Nearly all respondents stated that it would have no effect on Darfur.

Leaders were asked why the negotiations in Doha between the Justice and Equality Movement and the Government of Sudan

would not bring peace. The most common reasons were that only the JEM was present and that President Bashir would never implement the agreement.

A large majority of interviewees [80%] felt that other rebel movements should attend the peace talks in Doha. The most common responses given by leaders for why other movements should attend were the importance of unity among the groups and the impossibility of peace without widespread participation. Among the leaders who did not think that other groups should attend, the most common reasons were that not all the rebel groups were legitimate and that the respondents felt that there was no point in negotiating with the government.

Leaders were asked to articulate beliefs about how certain issues that had been contentious during past peace negotiations could be resolved, including power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and disarmament.

On the issue of power-sharing, leaders most commonly responded that political power should be distributed in proportion to population size, that there should be guaranteed regional representation, including Darfurian representatives in the central government, and that there should be democracy.

On the issue of wealth-sharing, leaders most commonly responded that wealth should be distributed in proportion to population size, that Darfur should get the same type of agreement as South Sudan did in the CPA, that wealth should be shared equally among all regions of Sudan, that there should be more Darfurians in the public sector, and that the international community should be in charge of distributing the wealth. Leaders also spoke about the importance of development, specifically the need for health, education, and economic development projects in Darfur.

On the issue of disarmament, leaders most commonly responded that President Bashir should be arrested and that UN/ international involvement was necessary to actually undertake disarmament.

Nearly all respondents [96%] felt that their individual interests were not represented in past peace negotiations.

Respondents were asked which groups needed to be included at future peace negotiations in order for their interests to be represented and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. SLA/AW was cited most frequently [46%], followed by the JEM [31%], the international community [15%],

Who needs to be included at future peace negotiations for your interests to be represented?*

* Open ended question
Multiple responses permitted

	Fur N=62(183) NR=6(16)	Zaghawa N=756(604) NR=60(49)	Massalit N=650(502) NR=144(107)	Erenga N=22(85) NR=5(17)	Dajo N=22(84) NR=4(15)	Misseriya N=42(91) NR=6(12)	Jebel N=25(62) NR=9(20)	Tama
SLA/Abdul Wahid	92	33	54	58	67	71	57	
JEM/Khalil Ibrahim	7	49	13	43	41	45	18	
International community	15	15	16	6	7	16	21	
Sheiks in the camps	4	7	4	2	6	2	9	
Refugees/IDPs	1	5	9	6	4	7	2	
UN	4	8	5	0	6	2	1	
Tribal sheiks/shartais	2	1	9	6	4	0	5	
SLA/Minni Minnawi	0	18	2	2	0	3	1	
SLA/Unity	0	6	4	5	0	1	3	
Other	2	6	5	1	4	1	1	
JEM/Other	1	1	1	9	0	1	1	
Rebels non-signatories	0	2	1	1	2	1	3	
SLA	1	1	1	0	4	1	2	

traditional tribal leaders [11%], civil society [11%], refugee and IDP leaders [7%], the UN [6%], and women's leaders [5%].

When respondents were asked which individuals or groups most closely represented their views, the most common response was SLA/AW [37%], which was followed by the JEM [27%]. Strikingly, SLA/AW found substantially more support from men [52%] than from women [23%] and the JEM found substantially more support from women [33%] than from men [19%]. Moreover, SLA/AW was chosen by an overwhelming majority of the members of the Fur tribe [91%] and by only a small

country in Africa or the Arab world to hold peace talks. Just over one-third said yes; however, of those who did trust an African or Arab country, there was no consensus as to which country.

VII. REPARATIONS

Compensation was very important to respondents. Virtually all interviewees [99%] believed that all victims deserved to be compensated for their losses during the conflict.

When asked which losses people should be compensated for, the most frequent

government. However, most respondents [87%] thought that compensation should be paid for by the Government of Sudan. A small minority [14%] believed that compensation should be paid for by the international community.

Interviewees were asked what form compensation should take and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. Nearly everyone responded that compensation should come in the form of money [94%]. A minority also thought that compensation should also be given in the form of livestock [19%], education projects [15%], health projects [13%], and land [7%].

Who *most* closely represents you views?*

* Open ended question
One response permitted

	Fur N=67(199)	Zaghawa N=781(653)	Massalit N=804(609)	Erenga N=22(102)	Dajo N=29(99)	Misseriya Jebel N=40(103)	Tama N=104(82)
SLA/Abdul Wahid	91	16	54	45	66	53	54
JEM/Khalil Ibrahim	0	45	7	41	17	31	17
International community	2	6	10	5	6	6	16
Other	2	9	8	3	7	8	4
Sheikhs/tribal leaders	3	1	7	3	1	0	6
UN	0	7	6	1	2	0	2

minority of the Zaghawa tribe [16%]. No Fur respondents reported that JEM most closely represented their views. A minority of interviewees stated that their interests were most closely represented by the UN/ international community [14%]. A minority also stated that their views were most closely represented by refugee and IDP/traditional tribal leaders [6%].

Leaders were asked what they believed was the best location for peace negotiations. The most common response was the United States of America or Europe. Leaders were further asked if they would trust any

responses were livestock [86%], possessions [86%], death of family members [74%], loss of income [40%], displacement [14%], personal injury [11%], psychological trauma [12%], and exposure to violence [10%]. Very few respondents remarked that people should be compensated for losses of land [1%].

A large majority of people interviewed thought that compensation should be given to individuals [86%]. A minority [16%] felt that compensation should be given to communities. Almost no respondents [4%] wanted compensation to be given to the

Nearly all interviewees [97%] said they trusted the international community to fairly determine compensation amounts. 71% trusted refugee/IDP leaders [70% of men; 71% of women; 72% of leaders], 54% trusted traditional tribal leaders [42% of men; 64% of women; 48% of leaders], 60% trusted rebel groups, 20% trusted the local government, and 9% said they trusted the national government.

I am going to read a list of groups. Please tell me whether or not you trust them to determine what fair compensation you receive.

		Strongly trust	Somewhat trust	Somewhat distrust	Strongly distrust
Native/Tribal Administration	N=1778(1782) NR=63(62)	47	7	8	38
Refugee/IDP leaders	N=1803(1804) NR=37(39)	61	10	5	25
Local government	N=1766(1774) NR=74(69)	15	5	4	76
National government	N=1767(1772) NR=75(72)	6	3	2	89
Rebel leaders	N=1762(1773) NR=77(69)	46	13	9	31
International community	N=1796(1798) NR=44(43)	95	3	0	2

VIII. DEMOCRACY

Every interviewee was asked to articulate what democracy meant to him or her. 46% of respondents did not know, were uncertain, or refused to answer. Of those who did know, the most common response was that democracy meant freedom [42%], which sometimes took the form of “freedom to do” something [such as choose your government], sometimes took the form of “freedom from” something [such as government persecution], but was often just “freedom.” The next most frequent responses were justice [27%], peace/end of violence [15%], human rights [15%], voting [13%], power-sharing among tribes [9%], ability to change government [6%], ability to choose government [6%], economic development [6%], and fair distribution of resources [4%]. Participants were permitted to volunteer multiple responses, and many believed that democracy is some combination of the above.

Participants were asked what they considered to be the most important characteristics of a democracy. Freedom was most frequently mentioned as the most important characteristic [30%], followed by justice [11%], peace [8%], elections [7%], freedom of expression [8%], rights [5%], equality [5%], and regime change [5%]. The ordering of these characteristics was similar when respondents were asked about the second and third most important aspects of

Elections will not be fair. Darfurians are still IDPs and refugees, they cannot participate, and the Janjaweed and Bashir still have power.



Refugee Leader
DJABAL CAMP

a democracy. Development was mentioned 15% of the time as one of the second or third most important characteristics of a democracy.

Despite the general lack of expressed understanding of democracy, virtually all respondents [99%] reported that they believed it is very important to live in a democracy.

A minority of those interviewed [33%; 51% of leaders] had voted in a previous election.

Male interviewees [65%; 84% of leaders] were more likely than female interviewees

[21%; 36% of leaders] to have heard that the Government of Sudan had agreed to hold national elections sometime in the next year. Of those who had heard about the elections, the vast majority [91%; 96% leaders] believed that they would be very unfair.

Leaders who felt that the elections would be unfair were asked why. The most frequent responses were that refugees and IDPs were not allowed to vote, that the government was not committed to democracy and would not allow the elections to be fair, that there was still a war going on, and that the government was made up of criminals.

Of those who had heard about the elections, only a minority [19%] responded that they would participate if given the opportunity to do so. Those who did not want to participate said that they would change their mind if there were a peace agreement [23%], if they got to vote from home [21%], if they were able to return to Darfur [22%], after the removal of President Bashir [15%], if there were international monitors [10%], or after security had been established [5%]. A small minority [7%] stated that they would not participate under any conditions.

Each leader was asked whether he or she felt that it was possible to have his or her interests represented at the local, state, or national level in the upcoming elections. A minority [20%] felt that it was possible that their interests could be represented at the local level. No leader thought that his or her interests would be represented at the state or national level.

Leaders were also asked if they would support a peace agreement granting the National Congress Party majority control of the national and regional government until a “fair and free” election took place. The vast majority [82%] would not support such an agreement.

Respondents were asked who could best represent their views if elections were held tomorrow. “No one” was the most common response [27%; 32% of male civilians; 23%

of female civilians; 50% of leaders]. The next most common answer was Abdul Wahid Mohamed Alnour [25%; 31% of male civilians; 18% of female civilians; 20% of leaders], the JEM [18%; 15% of male civilians, 28% of female civilians, 20% of leaders], Minni Minnawi [8%], their camp *sheikb/* traditional tribal leader [5%], and SPLM/ Salva Kiir [2%].

IX. RECONCILIATION

Respondents were asked whom, if anyone, they saw as their enemies in the conflict and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. Interviewees most frequently answered the Government of Sudan [65%], the Janjaweed [42%], President Bashir [32%], and tribes of Arab origin [16%]. Fewer than 1% of respondents mentioned tribes of non-Arab origins or Darfurian rebels.


A majority [59%] of interviewees strongly or somewhat believed that it is impossible for former enemies to live together peacefully after a war. Women [73%] were substantially more likely than men [44%] to respond this way.

When asked what the term Janjaweed meant, the most common response was Arabs/Arab tribes [83%]. Many respondents named specific tribes; however, no one tribe was mentioned by more than 10%

of respondents. Some interviewees stated government soldiers/militia [11%], Popular Defense Forces [7%], and border guards [4%].

The majority [59%] of respondents held the tribes from which the Janjaweed came collectively responsible for the crimes committed by the Janjaweed, with the remainder [34%] holding only the individuals who perpetrated crimes responsible. There were no significant differences between men’s and women’s responses.


Do you hold these tribes or groups responsible collectively for the crimes committed by the Janjaweed or do you hold responsible only the individuals who perpetrated crimes?



If elections were to happen tomorrow, who could best represent your views?*

- ① No one
- ② SLA/AW
- ③ Other
- ④ JEM
- ⑤ SPLM
- ⑥ Minni Minnawi
- ⑦ Tribal leadership

Males Females



* Open ended question

N=M640(728) F721(659)

Men [50%] were substantially more likely than women [23%] to be able to see themselves living peacefully in the future with the tribes from which the Janjaweed came. These numbers dropped [to 31% and 12%, respectively] when referring to the actual members of the Janjaweed.

Respondents with at least some secondary education were also more likely to strongly agree that it is possible to live together peacefully with these tribes.

Leaders who could envision themselves living peacefully with the Janjaweed [tribes or individuals] in the future were asked to articulate the conditions under which this would be the case. The most common responses were after disarmament, return of land, regime change, and a peace agreement.

Leaders who could not see themselves living peacefully with the Janjaweed usually reported that they held this view because they perceived the Janjaweed to be “killers” and “criminals.”

All participants were asked to articulate what reconciliation meant to them and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. The most common answers were forgiveness [38%], the ability to live in peace with former enemies [26%], the implementation of justice [16%], and compensation [13%]. Most respondents [77%] thought that reconciliation was possible between the tribes of Darfur.

Leaders were asked what role the government should play in tribal reconciliation. Most respondents [69%] felt that the government should play no role in tribal reconciliation, a minority [15%] thought that the government should mediate reconciliation, and a smaller minority [10%] responded that the government should only observe reconciliation.

All rebel groups should participate [at Doha] together so that we get peace right away. Individual negotiations will bring problems.




Rebel Leader
DJABAL CAMP

When asked to state up to three things that would have to happen before Darfurians should consider what should happen to former combatants, the most common responses were disarmament, cessation of violence/improved security, and prosecution of criminals.


Respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with several statements concerning what should happen to former combatants who had killed or raped,


once there was peace in Darfur. The vast majority [87%] strongly agreed that former combatants should not be accepted into their communities in any case and that they should be punished. A very small minority strongly or somewhat agreed that their crimes should be forgotten [4%], that they should be accepted after they apologized publicly and begged for forgiveness [6%], or that they should be made to pay *diya* [blood money] [11%].

Now I'm going to read a new statement and I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree: In the future, I can see myself living peacefully with the *tribes* from which the Janjaweed came.



Now I'm going to read a new statement and I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree: In the future, I can see myself living peacefully with *actual members* of the Janjaweed.





X. AMNESTY

Respondents were asked whether there were any conditions under which they would accept a policy that allowed some people who took part in violence to be integrated into post-conflict society without any conditions other than an agreement to stop fighting. A strong majority of interviewees [93%] stated that no such conditions existed.

XI. JUSTICE IN GENERAL TERMS

Interviewees were asked a series of questions about how responsible certain groups were for the violence that had occurred in Darfur over the previous six years. Virtually all respondents [99%] stated that Sudanese government officials were very responsible. When asked the same about Janjaweed commanders, 99% held them to be very

responsible. Most respondents also felt that government army commanders [95% very responsible; 3% somewhat responsible], government soldiers [82% very responsible; 9% somewhat responsible], and Janjaweed soldiers [95% very responsible; 3% somewhat responsible] were responsible for the violence in Darfur over the past six years. Over 90% of respondents felt that it was very important to hold all members of these groups accountable for their actions.

Respondents were asked whom they believed to be most responsible for the violence that had occurred in Darfur over the past six years. A large majority [72%] of respondents cited Sudanese government officials, with another 11% citing President Bashir specifically. A minority saw the Janjaweed or Janjaweed leaders as most responsible [14%].

Respondents infrequently held rebel commanders responsible for the violence

[12% very; 7% somewhat], and rarely held rebel soldiers responsible [9% very; 5% somewhat]. 34% of respondents thought it very important to hold rebel commanders accountable, and 29% thought it very important to hold rebel soldiers accountable.

Almost all respondents [over 90%] thought that all Sudanese government officials, commanders, and soldiers as well as Janjaweed commanders and soldiers who perpetrated violence should be held accountable in criminal trials conducted by the international community in general or the International Criminal Court in particular.

Nearly three-quarters of respondents believed that rebel commanders [72%] and rebel soldiers [70%] who perpetrated violence should be held accountable through criminal trials. The majority of

How should people be held accountable?*			* Open ended question One response permitted		
			Criminal Trials	Traditional Justice	Other
Sudanese government officials	N=1707(1713) NR=56(59)		99	1	0
Sudanese army commanders	N=1694(1700) NR=56(59)		99	1	0
Sudanese government soldiers	N=1644(645) NR=56(60)		96	4	0
Janjaweed commanders	N=1706(1711) NR=52(57)		100	5	0
Janjaweed soldiers	N=1694(1697) NR=52(57)		98	2	6
Darfurian rebel commanders	N=639(642) NR=104(101)		74	20	8
Darfurian rebel soldiers	N=587(592) NR=105(102)		70	23	7

Who should be in charge of the criminal justice trial?*			* Open ended question One response permitted			
			Sudanese Government	African Regional Court	ICC	Tribal Leaders
Sudanese government officials	N=1582(1608) NR=36(34)		3	1	96	0
Sudanese army commanders	N=1557(1586) NR=38(36)		3	1	96	0
Sudanese government soldiers	N=1511(1534) NR=38(37)		4	4	91	1
Janjaweed commanders	N=1579(1606) NR=36(35)		3	1	95	0
Janjaweed soldiers	N=1566(1592) NR=40(38)		4	2	93	1
Darfurian rebel commanders	N=566(581) NR=99(97)		5	20	62	13
Darfurian rebel soldiers	N=521(533) NR=96(96)		5	21	60	14

respondents stated that rebel commanders [62%] and rebel soldiers [60%] should be tried by the international community or the ICC. Approximately 20% of respondents thought that rebels should be tried in an African regional court. Almost no one [5%] said that anyone who perpetrated violence during the conflict should be tried by the Sudanese government.

Nearly all interviewees [94%] thought that government officials who perpetrated crimes should be put to death. The number decreased slightly for Janjaweed commanders [93%], government

commanders [87%], Janjaweed soldiers [86%], and government soldiers [73%]. This number dropped substantially for rebel commanders [29%] and rebel soldiers [24%].

There was also support for sending government soldiers [24%], rebel commanders [55%], and rebel soldiers [55%] to prison. There was a small amount of support for allowing government soldiers [3%], rebel commanders [11%], and rebel soldiers [14%] to pay *diya* as a form of punishment.

A minority [28%] of interviewees would

be very or somewhat satisfied if those who personally perpetrated crimes against them or their community were not punished but their bosses were.

XII. TRADITIONAL JUSTICE

Nearly all respondents (91%) were familiar with the traditional justice mechanisms of *judiya*, *ableeya*, *sulub*, and *diya*.

Many of those interviewed (45%) reported that they had witnessed serious crimes in their community prior to the current conflict. Those who reported witnessing serious crimes also reported that traditional

reconciliation mechanisms (such as *judiya*, *ableeya*, and *suluh*) were used in the majority (62%) of cases; *diya* was also widely used (51%) in the aftermath of serious crimes or violence.

The majority of respondents believed that *judiya*, *ableeya*, and *suluh* [87%] and *diya* [85%] are very important for enabling the people of Darfur to live in peace. However, nearly no one [6%] believed that these

methods alone would be sufficient for dealing with the crimes that have occurred during the current conflict.

Leaders who did not believe that traditional justice mechanisms would be sufficient for dealing with the crimes committed during the current conflict were asked why. Their responses fell primarily into two categories. First, traditional justice mechanisms were never meant to deal with crimes of this magnitude. Second, traditional justice

mechanisms were designed for disputes between tribes or between individuals, not for disputes between tribes or individuals and the government.

XIII. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Men were substantially more likely [92%] than women [72%] to have heard of the International Criminal Court. Most of those respondents who had heard of the ICC reported that they did not know very much about what it does. 20% of men [30% of leaders] and 7% of women [12% of leaders] reported that they understood what the court does.

The vast majority [98%] of leaders who knew about the ICC considered it to be an impartial institution.


Many of those respondents who had heard about the ICC knew about the arrest

“ Without a unified voice, negotiations won't bring peace. One rebel group will only represent its own personal interests; we need all voices represented.


Rebel Leader
GAGA CAMP

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
For the people of Darfur to live together in peace, do you believe that *judiya*, *ableeya*, and *suluh* will be very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or very unimportant?



For the people of Darfur to live together in peace, do you believe that *diya* will be very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or very unimportant?



I am now going to read a statement. ‘These traditional justice methods alone will be sufficient for dealing with crimes that have occurred during the current conflict in Darfur.’ Do you...?



BACKGROUND INFO

TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP

In pre-colonial Sudan and during the Darfur Sultanate, community and tribal affairs were managed by tribal leaders. Tribes had well-organized, respected leadership structures that provided effective decentralized governance. The system was multi-tiered, with the sultan appointing regional chiefdoms, or *shartaya*, concerned primarily with administration, justice, and taxation. The *shartaya* was further segmented into local chiefdoms. The village *sheikh* was responsible for the direct management of the land, tax collection, settlement of small-scale conflicts, and all ceremonial duties.

With the coming of the colonial period, the British decided to recognize and reinforce these structures, creating a formalized Native Administration (*idara ableeya*) as a form of indirect rule and a way to effectively manage local affairs through leaders that enjoyed legitimacy.

Under the new system, the native administrator's primary responsibility was to maintain law and order in his territory. The system created a political hierarchy of local chiefs and a parallel hierarchy of native courts that dealt with minor criminal and civil cases of customary law. The system utilized the already established *dars* to create or maintain a multi-tiered structure. At the top is the paramount chief, though there are variations in the titles depending on tribe and tradition. The paramount chief delegates authority to *omdas*, who are sometimes the heads of tribal sub-sections. At the bottom level are the village *sheikhs*. All three tiers together are charged with maintaining law and order, administering justice, and collecting taxes.

The system has been politicized over recent years and its function has changed in some ways. Successive governments attempted to abolish the system, relying instead on government-created local and area councils. The changes were not widely accepted, however, and tribal leaders were still recognized by their constituents. The Native Administration has since been re-established and tribal leaders have regained administrative authority.

BACKGROUND INFO


TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION MECHANISMS

In Darfur, traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms center on mediation and compensation, usually in the form of money or livestock. According to the traditional mediation systems, *judiya* and *ableeya*, the parties in a dispute call on a third, neutral party, usually several elders from a tribe not party to the dispute, to serve as mediators (*ajaweed*). The mediators assess the losses in terms of deaths, injuries, or property destroyed or stolen. They place a monetary value on the losses and compensation (*ta'aweed*) is paid.

The mediation systems were designed to deal with small-scale disputes between tribes or within the tribe itself. They were not intended to address large-scale violence. They are versions of the blood-money (*diya*) system, in which guilty parties pay money or livestock to compensate for the death of an opposing tribesman. The process is managed by the Native Administration, from the village *sheikh* for minor offenses to the *omda*, *shartai*, or even sultan in dealing with more complicated matters or inter-tribal disputes.

Since independence, larger inter-tribal conflicts, particularly those involving large-scale livestock raiding or multiple deaths, have been dealt with by tribal leaders through inter-tribal conferences or meetings, sometimes also called *judiya*, *ableeya*, or *suluh*. *Suluh*, meaning "reconciliation" in Arabic, is often described as rooted in the conflict resolution concepts of the Koran and the Islamic faith. The goal of all traditional justice and reconciliation processes is to repair the damage done by conflict and to return to peaceful co-existence between the individuals, tribes, or groups.

Which of the following best represents your knowledge of the International Criminal Court?



- ① : I have not heard of ICC
- ② : I heard of ICC, but have limited knowledge
- ③ : I heard of ICC and know its function

N=1828(1831) NR=28(30)

warrants that had been issued for President Bashir [99%], Ali Kushayb [42%], and Ahmed Haroun [37%].

Virtually all respondents [98%] thought that President Bashir should be tried before the ICC.

XIV. PEACE AND JUSTICE

Almost none [6%] of the interviewees would be very or somewhat satisfied if those responsible for causing suffering in Darfur went either temporarily or permanently unpunished. The commonly cited reasons for this were that the crimes were too great and that without

punishment the crimes would be repeated.

Only a very small minority [7%] of leaders would be very or somewhat satisfied if the NCP signed a peace agreement that met their demands and included a condition that President Bashir be offered exile in a foreign country.

Respondents were asked whether they believed that pursuing justice now through the ICC would endanger the prospect for peace in Darfur. A minority [13%] answered that it would endanger peace.

Leaders who did not believe that pursuing justice through the ICC would endanger peace were asked why they felt that this was so.

BACKGROUND INFO


THE ICC AND THE DARFUR CONFLICT

On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council asked the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to investigate “the situation prevailing in Darfur since 01 July 2002.” A Security Council referral is one of three ways to trigger ICC investigations. This was the first time the council exercised this power. Three months later, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo opened an investigation. In May 2007, ICC Pre-trial Chamber I (PTCI) issued arrest warrants for then-Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and alleged Janjaweed militia leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), who were identified as key suspects and accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the United Nations Security Council referral requires that all parties to the conflict comply with the court’s decisions, Sudan maintains that the court has no jurisdiction over the matter and has refused to hand over any suspects.

The Prosecutor further requested a warrant against President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir for war crimes, crimes against humanity and, for the first time in the court’s seven-year history, genocide. PTCI issued the warrant for President Bashir’s arrest on March 4, 2009, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but ruled that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate a charge of genocide. Nearly a year later, the Appeals Chamber reversed PTCI’s decision on the charge of genocide, holding that the standard of proof used was too high and ordering PTCI to revisit the decision. PTCI has yet to rule on the genocide charge using the revised standard of proof.


The court has issued three summonses to appear for rebel commanders suspected of orchestrating a 2007 attack on the African Union base at Haskanita in North Darfur. The first suspect, Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, voluntarily appeared before the court in February 2010. Judges ruled that although crimes did occur, there was insufficient evidence linking Abu Garda to the attack. The two other commanders, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, appeared voluntarily in June 2010, and a hearing to confirm the charges was scheduled for November 2010.

Do you believe that pursuing justice now through the International Criminal Court will endanger the prospect for peace in Darfur?



Many people have different opinions about whether the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Omar Al-Bashir will have an effect on the health and security of people living inside Darfur.

Do you believe that the indictment will have a very positive effect, a somewhat positive effect, no effect, a somewhat negative effect, or a very negative effect on the health and security of the people living inside Darfur?



If the problem were between the tribes of Darfur themselves, then yes, traditional justice would work. But the problem comes from the government. The government created this and therefore it needs to go to the ICC.



Rebel Leader
OUTSIDE
THE CAMPS

The predominant response was that criminal justice was essential for securing peace.

Leaders were asked whether, and to what extent, they thought the ICC's indictment of President Bashir would affect the health and security of people living in Darfur.

Men [51%] were more likely than women [29%] to think that it would have a positive effect. Men [33%] were also more likely than women [24%] to think that it would have a negative effect. Women [46%] were far more likely than men [16%] to believe that it would have no effect.

Those who thought the indictment would have a positive effect generally believed that prosecution would stop crimes and that without it there would be worse crimes.

Those who responded that it would have a negative effect often cited the fact that it had resulted in the expulsion of NGOs from the IDP camps in Darfur; some mentioned that there would be reprisal killings.

XV. TRUTH-TELLING MECHANISMS

The majority [71%] of respondents considered it important that those involved in perpetrating wrongs publicly admit to what they had done. However, few [11%] respondents thought that there were groups of perpetrators for whom they would find it acceptable to reduce the severity of their criminal [or traditional] punishment after a public admission of culpability.

Of the 11% who did believe that there should be a sentence reduction, a minority supported this idea for government officials [39%], Janjaweed commanders [30%], and Janjaweed soldiers [49%]. Most supported

BACKGROUND INFO

PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE

In early March 2009, the International Criminal Court's Pre-trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir. President Bashir responded by publicly denouncing the court and expelling 13 international aid agencies from Darfur that he alleged were providing evidence to the ICC prosecutor. The warrant, and President Bashir's response, triggered debate pitting peace against justice. The central issues of that debate have been whether the pursuit of justice in general and the indictment of President Bashir in particular would negatively affect the prospects for peace and whether criminal justice proceedings should be forgone or postponed as a result.

The official mechanism for deferring an indictment is found in Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which asserts that "no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded" during the 12 months after the United Nations Security Council has made a request for postponement under the power vested in it by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Those in favor of invoking Article 16 usually argue that the indictment could exacerbate conflict, hinder the peace process, and negatively affect the health and welfare of civilians. Those opposed usually assert either that the indictment would serve the interest of peace or that justice should be pursued independently of its effect on peace. At the same time, some maintain that the warrant would have no effect at all on efforts to secure peace.

Many contend that this debate is further complicated by the fact that the warrant is likely unenforceable without Sudan's voluntary compliance or an outside intervention. As a result, they further contend that what is really debated is the effect of the warrant alone on the interests of peace, not the effect of arrest or prosecution.

So long as they can commit crimes with impunity, there cannot be peace on the ground.



Rebel Leader
FARCHANA CAMP

this idea for government commanders [60%], government soldiers [83%], rebel commanders [89%], and rebel soldiers [95%].

XVI. THE DARFUR REBELLION

The vast majority [96%] of interviewees believed that the Darfur rebellion was justified.

Leaders were asked what the rebel groups needed to do to achieve peace. The most common responses were to take part in peace talks, fight until there was peace, and seek the opinion of the people.


Nearly all respondents [95%] felt that rebel unity was very important.

Leaders were asked why rebel unity had not been achieved and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. The most frequent responses were that the leaders were self-interested or greedy [48%], that the government manipulated the various rebel movements against each other [32%], that there are intractable policy differences [26%], and that some rebel groups favor their own tribes [22%].

The vast majority of leaders [92%] thought that rebel unity was achievable. When asked how it could be achieved, the most common responses were to unite under one leader [usually Abdul Wahid Mohamed Alnour or Khalil Ibrahim], through pressure from refugee and IDP communities, and through pressure from the international community.

The vast majority of leaders [86%] believed that rebel groups should attend peace talks with the Government of Sudan under certain conditions. However, only a minority [23%] believed that they should do so without preconditions. The most common preconditions mentioned were disarmament, security, and a ceasefire.


Do you believe that the Darfur rebellion was justified?



[92%] : Very justified
 [3%] : Somewhat justified
 [2%] : Somewhat unjustified
 [3%] : Very unjustified

N=1738(1738) NR=115(121)

Is rebel unity important in order to achieve peace?




[96%] : Very important
 [2%] : Somewhat important
 [0%] : Somewhat unimportant
 [2%] : Very unimportant

N=1803(1807) NR=51(52)

Why has rebel unity not been achieved?*

Leaders Only
 N=159



① : Groups are overly tribal ③ : Government of Sudan is trying to manipulate the leaders
 ② : Leaders are self-interested ④ : There are intractable policy differences

* Open ended question—Multiple responses permitted

BACKGROUND INFO

THE SUDAN LIBERATION ARMY/MOVEMENT

In the early 2000s, a group of primarily Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit intellectuals and some former military officers founded the Darfur Liberation Movement. In early 2003 they renamed themselves the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). The movement's manifesto, advocating a united and secular Sudan, echoed the "New Sudan" vision of the late John Garang, former chairman of the SPLM/A.

The chairman was Abdul Wahid Mohamed Ahmed Alnour, a Fur lawyer; Khamis Abdallah Abbakar, a Massalit, was vice-president; and Abdallah Abbakar Bashar, a Zaghawa, was the chief of staff. After the death of Bashar in late 2003, his secretary, the Zaghawa Minni Arku Minnawi, became the general secretary of the movement. Abdel Wahid soon left Darfur and has remained in exile, most recently in France.

By mid-2005 divisions had grown within the organization, which resulted in a split into two factions: Sudan Liberation Army/ Abdul Wahid and Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi, which negotiated separately at the 2006 Abuja peace talks. Only Minni Minnawi's faction signed the agreement, gaining him a post in the government as Senior Assistant to the President. With Minnawi as part of the government, his troops often engaged militarily with non-signatory factions over territorial control.

Since the Abuja talks, both SLA factions have experienced increased fragmentation. SLA/AW has refused to attend any negotiations since Abuja, demanding that security on the ground, disarmament of the Janjaweed, and the return of the displaced be pre-conditions to negotiations.

BACKGROUND INFO

THE LIBERATION AND JUSTICE MOVEMENT

In February 2010, a new rebel coalition called the Liberation and Justice Movement emerged.⁴ The movement was led by Tijani Sese, a former governor of Darfur in the 1980s living in exile since the early 1990s. Tijani is a prominent Darfuri intellectual and the brother of one of the main Fur traditional leaders. The movement includes a number of splinter factions formerly of the SLA and the JEM. As of July 2010, the LJM was engaged in peace negotiations with the Government of Sudan in Doha, Qatar.

⁴ The Liberation and Justice Movement did not exist at the time of our research. As such we have no data pertaining to the level of public support it has among the refugee population

BACKGROUND INFO

THE JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT

The Justice and Equality Movement was founded in the early 2000s by former supporters of the National Islamic Front. The movement's chairman, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, is a former minister and government advisor in Darfur and South Sudan. With their initial Zaghawa membership the JEM had enjoyed the support of their Zaghawa kin across the border in Chad and until early 2010, the Chadian President, Idriss Déby. The JEM was present at Abuja; however, it elected not to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement.

In May 2008 the JEM launched an attack on Sudan's capital, Khartoum. Repelled by Sudanese security forces on the banks of the Nile just outside of Khartoum, the attack nevertheless bolstered the JEM's reputation as a military force.

The JEM attended negotiations in Doha sporadically from 2008 to 2010. Soon after President Déby's visit to Khartoum in February 2010, the JEM signed a framework agreement for further negotiations with the Government of Sudan. JEM subsequently pulled out of all negotiations and has not returned.

“ If Abdul Wahid and Khalil agreed to unite, they would solve the Darfurian problem.

Refugee Leader
DJABAL CAMP

”

BACKGROUND INFO

AN INTERVIEW WITH: KHALIL IBRAHIM

Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, Chairman of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was interviewed in July 2009. Below are highlights from the interview.

CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT // Root causes are all socioeconomic, not religious. They are detailed in the Black Book, which was written by the JEM to illustrate, among other things, how power in Sudan is concentrated in the hands of a few minority tribes.

ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

// President Bashir decided to displace and kill the civilian population after he determined that he could not fight with the rebels directly. He recruited and paid the Popular Defense Forces and the Janjaweed and brought tribes from other countries.

JEM'S OBJECTIVES // Change the government and eradicate injustice. The JEM is not only preparing for war but also to become a political party.

JEM'S ATTACK ON OMDURMAN/KHARTOUM IN MAY 2008 // The battle was a landmark, which enhanced the JEM's popularity, showed the government that it cannot remain in power without war, caused the government to search for a solution

to the conflict, and catalyzed the International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict President Bashir.

WHOM HE SEES AS HIS ENEMY: Conflict is exclusively with the government and not with any individual tribe. He argues that the entire “periphery” of the country wants liberation from the “center.”

THE ETHNIC MAKEUP OF THE JEM // A variety of fighters from different tribes have recently joined the JEM. This includes Arab tribes, former Janjaweed, African tribes, tribes from the south, and even members of the Fur tribe; 18 other rebel movements have merged with the JEM.

PROSPECTS FOR SUDAN'S FUTURE // If things move along their current trajectory then the referendum in 2011 will lead to separation and ultimately to the fragmentation of the country. The only way out is for Sudan to become a federation, which would consist of (six) autonomous regions. This can be accomplished by preserving the religious diversity and working on the basis of consensus politics.

HAKURA // A *hakura* is an “administrative zone,” in which one tribe maintains control; however, in Sudan “land is for everyone” and no one from inside Sudan can be refused land. Most tribes have *hakura*, including most Arab tribes. Everyone knows that there will be no new *hakura* in Darfur; however, after a tribe has been living in a *hakura* for a lengthy period of time it becomes that tribe's *hakura* too. It is only foreigners who are fighting for land.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) // All criminals should face prosecution at the ICC.

THE “PEACE VS. JUSTICE” DEBATE // President Bashir's indictment will not threaten peace. In fact, the indictment is forcing President Bashir towards peace because he feels threatened. The indictment can be delayed if it is in the interest of peace and reconciliation, but he does not think that this is the case.

PRESIDENT BASHIR AND HIS ARMY // He is a criminal. He is very weak. For example, some of the JEM's prisoners are from the south of Sudan; they claim to have been tasked with shooting deserting Darfurian members of the military.

BACKGROUND INFO

AN INTERVIEW WITH: **ABDUL WAHID MOHAMED AHMED ALNOUR**

Abdul Wahid Mohamed Ahmed Alnour, Chairman of the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), was interviewed in July 2009. Below are highlights from the interview.

THE ORIGINS OF THE SLA // The SLA was founded as an outgrowth of a student movement, in pursuit of a secular state with equal citizenship rights. The initially political movement became a military one after the group realized that President Bashir would not negotiate. More specifically, the SLA was started for three reasons: (1) to stop the killing of their people in Darfur, (2) to negotiate equal citizenship rights and a secular state, and (3) to protect their actual members, some of whom (including Abdul Wahid) were imprisoned.

HOW PEACE IN DARFUR/SUDAN CAN BE ACHIEVED // Peace requires three phases: (1) conflict suspension, which requires the cessation of killing, rape, and genocide, (2) conflict resolution, which entails addressing root causes, such as power-sharing, wealth-sharing, development-sharing, equal rights, etc., and (3) conflict transformation, which involves reconciliation dialogue between different groups.

TRIBALISM // He acknowledges that tribal identity exists in Sudan but stresses that the SLA is not a tribal movement and has done a lot of successful work related to getting different groups to reconcile, including Arabs and former Janjaweed. Arabs and non-Arabs used to live together peacefully and they will do so again in the future. Arabs now fight in the SLA.

WHOM HE SEES AS HIS ENEMY // The “Islamic fundamentalist regime” that divides the country along religious and geographical lines.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) // He supports Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo and believes that all criminals who are indicted should go to the ICC, including rebels.

Rebel unity can be achieved if there is real pressure from the people of Darfur, the diaspora, and the international community.



Refugee Leader
AM NABAK CAMP

THE “PEACE VS. JUSTICE” DEBATE // Pursuing justice will not hinder peace. Sudan is not just one person (i.e., President Bashir) and peace can be achieved without any specific individual. President Bashir’s indictment is not going to matter for negotiation because negotiation is not going to happen anyway.

THE GOVERNMENT AS AN HONEST NEGOTIATOR // The government will sign anything but implement nothing. It has signed numerous agreements and has never carried through with its obligations.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS // There is no point to negotiation until there is security, until the mechanism for killing is stopped. It is very difficult to move towards negotiations. The SLA has “no preconditions” for negotiations, other than human rights and security.

REFUGEE/INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS SUPPORT // The SLA/AW is widely supported in the camps. IDPs support the movement’s desire for a secular state.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HYBRID FORCE (UNAMID) // The force cannot protect itself so how is it going to protect the people?

HOW TO SOLVE THE CONFLICT // Darfur needs military intervention; peacemakers, not peacekeepers.

BACKGROUND INFO

LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN DARFUR

Among its main institutions, the Darfur sultanate had a complex land tenure system. The system remains largely intact today. Historically, the land tenure system had two key elements that sometimes overlapped.

The first element is *hawakir* (singular *hakura*), or estates, that the sultans distributed at their leisure to individuals such as traditional leaders, noblemen, religious men, and foreign traders, of all origins. This gave the owner rights to the wealth of the *hakura* and to tax its inhabitants. These were clearly individual or family rights.

The second element is *aldiyār* (singular *dar*), or territories, into which almost all of the Darfur Sultanate was divided. The *aldiyār* were ruled by chiefs from different ethnic groups. Insofar as the system allocated land to a dynasty belonging to a particular ethnic group, the system could be interpreted as one of collective property rights. This is why today the *dar* system is often understood as a division of Darfur into tribal territories and has become the basis of claims for tribal lands. However, although *dar* chiefs belonged to a particular ethnic group, they were much more like

area administrators than tribal leaders and were the chiefs of all people living within or passing through their *dar*.

Land rights historically did not mean exclusive access to land for particular tribes. All *hakura* or *dar* systems allow for the accommodation of new arrivals, whether individuals or groups. *Dar* chiefs could not generally prevent those who asked to settle peacefully within their jurisdiction from doing so, and newcomers that earned the trust of the governing tribe could gain the right to stay. Once newcomers were accepted, they could request farmland from the local leaders, as long as they agreed to remain ultimately subject to the administrative authorities of the area.

Among the traditionally nomadic Arab tribes, only the large cattle-herding groups of South Darfur hold a *dar*. The transitory nature of nomadic tribes means that most of the smaller cattle-herding and all the camel-herding tribes typically did not hold such rights. Their access to land and pastures was and continues to be managed through customary arrangements with sedentary tribes.

XVII. LAND

Nearly all interviewees farmed and herded in Darfur [99%] and owned their own land [98%], which was on their tribe's *dar* [97%]. 12% had previously paid for the right to graze his or her herd on land they did not own.

Nearly all respondents [97%] stated that it was very important for peace that the *hakura* system be restored.

When asked what was happening to their land now, the most frequent responses were that it was being occupied by other

people [65%], that they didn't know [25%], or that it was uninhabited [10%]. Those respondents who stated that it was being occupied by other people often specified that the occupiers were Janjaweed, Arabs, or foreigners. Those who stated that it was uninhabited often stated that it had been burned.

Leaders [40%] were more likely than civilians [23%] to have stated that they had visited their land in Darfur since coming to Chad.

Almost everyone [98%] desired to return to Darfur in the future to the location where

they previously lived. Respondents were asked under what conditions they would return to Darfur and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. The most common responses were after the violence stops [43%], after peace/a peace agreement [12%], once there was security [9%], after the arrest of President Bashir [9%], and after compensation was paid [4%].

Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements about what should happen to Darfurian tribes that did not have a *hakura*.

37% agreed that they should be given unused land.

35% agreed that they should go to any *sheikh* or *shartai* and ask for land and that the *sheikh* or *shartai* should give it to them.

17% agreed that they should be given certain rights to use other people's land.

17% agreed that they should be granted land but must pay a fee to the tribe that owned the land.

53% agreed that they should be made to leave Darfur.

Respondents were asked a similar series of questions about what should happen to individuals from tribes outside Darfur who come to Darfur in search of land.

9% agreed that they should be given unused land.

10% agreed that they should go to any *sheikh* or *shartai* and ask for land and that the *sheikh* or *shartai* should give it to them.

5% agreed that they should be given certain rights to use other people's land

8% agreed that they should be granted land but must pay a fee to the tribe that owned the land


I am going to read you several statements about what should happen to the *Darfurian tribes* that do not have a *hakura*. For each one, tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.

	Males	Females		Male	Female
They should be given land in areas where there are no villages and they should go live there.			Strongly agree	[21%]	[39%]
			Somewhat agree	[5%]	[8%]
			Somewhat disagree	[2%]	[2%]
			Strongly disagree	[72%]	[51%]
N=M827(923) F961(874) NR=M21(23) F46(39)					
They should be allowed to go to any <i>sheikh</i> or <i>shartai</i> and ask them for land and the <i>sheikh</i> or <i>shartai</i> should give them land.			Strongly agree	[20%]	[34%]
			Somewhat agree	[5%]	[8%]
			Somewhat disagree	[2%]	[2%]
			Strongly disagree	[73%]	[55%]
N=M827(925) F962(875) NR=M20(21) F46(39)					
They should be granted certain rights to use other people's land.			Strongly agree	[9%]	[18%]
			Somewhat agree	[2%]	[5%]
			Somewhat disagree	[3%]	[5%]
			Strongly disagree	[86%]	[73%]
N=M824(922) F967(878) NR=M20(22) F40(35)					
They should be granted land to use but must pay a fee to the tribe that owns the land.			Strongly agree	[12%]	[17%]
			Somewhat agree	[3%]	[3%]
			Somewhat disagree	[1%]	[4%]
			Strongly disagree	[84%]	[76%]
N=M826(924) F959(871) NR=M22(22) F42(37)					
They should be made to leave Darfur.			Strongly agree	[60%]	[43%]
			Somewhat agree	[3%]	[4%]
			Somewhat disagree	[5%]	[6%]
			Strongly disagree	[33%]	[47%]
N=M816(915) F967(875) NR=M30(29) F40(37)					

Whom, if anybody, from *inside Sudan*, do you trust to resolve land disputes?

* Open ended question
Multiple responses permitted

80



I am now going to read you several statements about what should happen to individuals from *tribes outside of Darfur* who come to Darfur in search of land. For each one tell me if you agree or disagree.

	Males	Females		Male	Female
They should be given land by the government.			Strongly agree	[4%]	[8%]
			Somewhat agree	[1%]	[5%]
			Somewhat disagree	[1%]	[2%]
			Strongly disagree	[94%]	[85%]
			N=M833(934) F981(891) NR=M11(9) F27(23)		
They should be allowed to go to any <i>sheikh/shartai</i> and ask for land and the <i>sheikh/shartai</i> should give them land.			Strongly agree	[5%]	[8%]
			Somewhat agree	[2%]	[5%]
			Somewhat disagree	[1%]	[3%]
			Strongly disagree	[92%]	[85%]
			N=M833(934) F982(890) NR=M10(8) F26(22)		
They should be granted certain rights to use other people's land.			Strongly agree	[3%]	[5%]
			Somewhat agree	[1%]	[2%]
			Somewhat disagree	[2%]	[4%]
			Strongly disagree	[95%]	[91%]
			N=M836(936) F973(884) NR=M9(3) F33(28)		
They should be granted land to use but must pay a fee to the tribe that owns the land.			Strongly agree	[5%]	[7%]
			Somewhat agree	[1%]	[2%]
			Somewhat disagree	[2%]	[2%]
			Strongly disagree	[92%]	[89%]
			N=M828(929) F969(882) NR=M15(12) F30(25)		
They should be made to leave Darfur			Strongly agree	[90%]	[77%]
			Somewhat agree	[1%]	[2%]
			Somewhat disagree	[2%]	[3%]
			Strongly disagree	[8%]	[17%]
			N=M819(918) F973(884) NR=M18(18) F31(26)		

84% agreed that they should be made to leave Darfur

Interviewees were asked whom, if anybody, from inside Sudan they trusted to resolve land disputes and were permitted to volunteer multiple responses. "No one" was the most frequent response [61%], followed by tribal leaders [25%]. Respondents were asked to articulate up to three things that they thought would have to happen before Darfurian farmers should permit nomads to pass through their lands. The most common responses were that nomads should not be permitted to pass [43%], that they should

be permitted to pass only if they gave up their weapons [36%], that they should be permitted to pass after specific routes were agreed upon [28%], if they passed through peacefully [17%], that they should be permitted to pass but not through farms [17%], after being granted permission [10%], or after a peace agreement was signed [5%].

Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements related to whether, once there was peace in Darfur and the refugees could return home, nomads should be able to pass through the homelands and villages of farmers.








14% agreed that they should be permitted to pass without permission.

22% agreed that they should be permitted to pass with permission.

31% agreed that nomad passage routes should be determined as part of peace agreements and then monitored by international agencies, in which case nomads should be permitted to pass even if farmers objected.

10% agreed that they should be permitted to pass if they paid a fee.

I am going to read you several statements. For each one, tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.



Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with another series of statements related to whether, once there was peace in Darfur and they could return home, nomadic Arab tribes should be able to settle and farm in villages near theirs.

14% agreed that they should be permitted to do so without permission as long as they were peaceful.

20% agreed that they should be permitted to do so if they asked for permission from a *sheikh* or *shartai*.

7% agreed that they should be permitted to do so after paying a fee.

Recommendations

The purpose of Darfurian Voices is twofold: first, to document what Darfurian refugees in Chad believe to be the necessary conditions for a just peace in Darfur, and second, to accurately transmit these beliefs to policymakers, negotiating parties, peace mediators, and other stakeholders in the hope that they will take the refugees' views into consideration when formulating Darfur-related policy.

For some issues, the results clearly indicated how the refugees thought the actors addressed below should structure policy. In these cases, recommendations flow from the results in a straightforward manner. For other issues, the policy implications of the results are less clear. Where it was necessary to infer recommendations in the latter cases, we endeavored to do so narrowly.

As such, these recommendations are carefully rooted in the data we collected and represent our best understanding of the refugee population's stated preferences and beliefs.

To the Government of Sudan:

- Negotiate, sign, and implement a just peace agreement for Darfur that provides security guarantees for the civilian population, gives sufficient monetary compensation to all victims of the conflict, and offers Darfur a share of Sudan's economic wealth and political power that is proportional to the size of its population.
- Fulfill your obligations to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1593; this includes surrendering to the court those individuals subject to ICC arrest warrants.
- Immediately take all steps necessary to ensure the safety and security of civilians by ordering the armed forces not to harm the civilian population, by disarming the Janjaweed and other militia groups, by preventing attacks by all armed actors, and by respecting past ceasefire agreements.

To the Darfur rebel movements:

- Unify. If total unification is impractical, then at minimum develop working relationships with other groups and complementary negotiation platforms. Recognize that there is almost no support among refugees for non-cooperation between groups, particularly Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid and the Justice and Equality Movement.
- Participate in the African Union–United Nations–mediated peace process and advocate forcefully for refugee interests.
- Maintain comprehensive communication with the displaced population and act in a manner that is fully responsive to their interests.

To the Native Administration in Darfur:

- Pursue local reconciliation efforts using traditional justice mechanisms.
- Encourage the rebel groups to unify.
- Make efforts to increase communication with the refugees to repair their lack of trust for traditional leaders in Sudan who did not leave with their people.

To the International Criminal Court:

- Work with States Parties to ensure the arrest and prosecution of President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Ahmad Muhammad Haroun ("Ahmad Haroun"), and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ("Ali Kushayb").
- Investigate, pursue the arrest of, and prosecute all government officials, government army commanders, and Janjaweed commanders suspected of being most responsible for perpetrating war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide in Darfur.

■ Take concrete steps to increase engagement with communities affected by the conflict and to educate them on the court's mandate, procedures, and efforts related to the conflict in Darfur:

- Maintain a permanent field presence in eastern Chad.
- Task the Outreach Unit of the Public Information and Documentation Section with maintaining open lines of communication with the refugee population through field visits and the use of widely accessible communication channels such as Arabic-language radio.
- Direct the Victim Participation and Reparations Section to fully inform the victims of their right to participate in ICC proceedings and to request reparations. Facilitate the application process and accept forms filed in Arabic.
- Stop describing the conflict's victims as solely the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit and acknowledge the experience of minority tribes.

To the African Union–United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team, UNAMID, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan, and all others involved in the peace process:

The refugee community is concerned not only with the substance of an agreement but also with the process through which the agreement is formed. Mediators should work together to ensure that any peace agreement reflects the stated desires of the refugee community, in particular:

■ **Substance:**

■ **Security as a top priority**

- Implement an internationally monitored ceasefire agreement.
- Disarm the Janjaweed and other paramilitary groups, employing oversight by the international community.
- Deploy military units and civilian groups – including unarmed human rights monitors and protection teams in the field – to monitor the implementation of security agreements.

■ **Compensation**

- Give compensation directly to all individuals who suffered violence in Darfur, primarily in the form of money. Recognize that refugees consider individual compensation to be far more important than community compensation.
- Give compensation to communities in the form of development projects, particularly in education and health, to be administered by community leaders.
- The amount of compensation should be determined and distributed by the United Nations/international community.
- All compensation should be paid by the Government of Sudan.

■ **Power-sharing and wealth-sharing**

- Allot political power at the national level to Darfur in proportion to its population.
- Promote elections in which all Darfurians may participate, regardless of where they reside.
- Allocate a fair share of revenue from national resources and other sources to Darfur in proportion to its population.
- Incorporate Darfurians into the civil service and other public-sector positions.

■ **Land**

- Recognize the right of everyone to return to his or her land, without exception.
- Acknowledge that most refugees wish to return to their land, and make rural areas a focus of relief, recovery, development, and security efforts to facilitate refugees' return.
- Require anyone who seized land during the conflict to vacate it immediately.

■ **Justice**

- Recognize that there is little to no support for amnesty among the refugee community and do not advance an unconditional amnesty provision.
-

■ **Process:**

■ **Rebel participation**

- Encourage rebel unity.
- Bring the JEM and the SLA/AW into the Doha peace process. Recognize that a very substantial portion of the refugee population will not consider any peace process legitimate without these particular groups' participation.

■ **Civil society participation**

- Include representatives of internally displaced persons, refugees, traditional leaders, women, and civil society organizations in all stages of the peace process.
- Conduct the selection of civil society representatives in an open, transparent, and inclusive manner.

To the United Nations Security Council:

- Renew the mandate of the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur.
- Ensure that member states provide UNAMID with all financial, logistical, and technical support as well as the appropriate personnel necessary to swiftly carry out its mandate.
- Focus support on strengthening the Mission's ability to carry out those aspects of its mandate related to disarmament, protecting civilians, and helping to facilitate an inclusive political process.
- Take steps in cooperation with the Government of Chad to permit continued deployment of Chadian and international forces to secure and protect Darfurian refugees.
- Execute a concrete response to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber's finding of non-cooperation by the Sudanese government with respect to the ICC's cases against Ahmad Haroun and Ali Kushayb, such that their arrest will be hastened.

To the international community:

- Ensure that a primary focus of your foreign policy is the provision of safety and security to the people of Darfur.
- Provide UNAMID with all financial, logistical, and technical support as well as the personnel necessary to swiftly fulfill its mandate.

■ Fully support the Doha peace process:

- Provide the AU/UN Joint Mediation Support Team and UNAMID Civil Affairs with all resources necessary to mediate a successful and inclusive peace process.
- Pressure the Government of Sudan and the National Congress Party in particular to make real security guarantees, including international oversight of disarmament.
- Facilitate SLA/AW and the JEM's participation in the negotiations.

■ Fully support the ICC's Darfur efforts with respect to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of those accused of crimes falling within the court's jurisdiction.

■ Refrain from providing military assistance to the Government of Sudan and work to prevent other nations from doing so.

APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

SURVEY INSTRUMENT DESIGN

The questionnaire was designed over an 18-month period in consultation with academic experts and members of the Darfurian diaspora. In April 2008, a version of the survey was piloted among the Darfurian diaspora community in Brooklyn, New York. In May and June 2008 the survey was piloted in Chad. This involved conducting interviews and focus groups with refugees in N'Djamena, Abéché, and the Gaga refugee camp. In March 2009, the questionnaire was piloted in the Darfurian diaspora communities in the United Kingdom.

The survey instrument included both closed and open-ended questions. There were two versions of the survey instrument. The civilian survey, administered to randomly selected ordinary civilians, had approximately 75 questions and took approximately one hour to conduct. The leadership survey, administered to civil society, tribal, and rebel leaders, had approximately 125 questions and took approximately two hours to conduct. The questions on the leadership survey instrument included all the questions asked on the civilian survey plus additional questions that addressed issues specific to the refugee leadership.

LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION

The survey questionnaire was produced in English and subsequently translated by two different translators into Sudanese Arabic. These two versions were then compared and merged. This revised version was then back-translated into English by two additional translators. A translators' roundtable was then convened during which the four translators discussed all four versions of the survey. A final version was produced. This version was translated into Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit. Because these languages are traditionally non-written, translations were produced using a phonetic Arabic transliteration.

FIELD RESEARCH TEAM

Our research team consisted of 27 people, 26 of whom were based in Chad during our field work. The team included 18 Darfurian expatriates residing in the United States, United Kingdom, or Chad, seven of whom were women. All except one of the interviewers were fluent in Darfurian Arabic. The majority also spoke Fur, Zaghawa, or Massalit. Each team member attended a 10-day training session on survey methodology and administration. Nearly all members of the team had worked or lived in Sudan or Chad and had extensive experience in refugee camp environments.

ADMINISTRATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY

The survey was interviewer-administered. Each interviewee was read a comprehensive informed consent protocol. With the exception of a few high-level rebel leaders, who requested to be identified, all interviews were recorded anonymously.

SAMPLING

Our sampling strategy drew from a "leaders" population and a "civilian" population.

Leaders: The leader population included local and community leadership as well as leaders from the rebel movements. Leaders were drawn from a combination of a sample of convenience and from an effort to interview the *sheikh* of every block in each refugee camp. Rebel leaders outside the camps were also interviewed when possible. A total of 280 leaders were interviewed and included in the dataset. All the results shown above pertain only to the 250 leaders who resided in the camps, as they are a very different population from the rebels, rebel commanders, and other high-level leaders interviewed separately. Although we strove to generate a sample that was broadly reflective of the refugee population, particularly with respect to gender and ethnicity, it must be emphasized that this is not a random sample.

Civilians: 1,872 civilians were interviewed. Our target population was the adult (18 years or older) refugee population from Darfur living in all 12 Darfurian refugee camps in eastern Chad. We oversampled several groups to obtain better statistical power for comparisons. The likelihood of any individual adult refugee being sampled was 0.75%

We used a stratified random sampling method, with geographic location (camp and block) and gender as strata. The first stratum was location, with the number of interviews from a given block in a given camp set to be proportional to the population of the block. An equal number of men and women were sampled in each block. This constituted an oversampling of men, as their natural proportion in the camp was approximately 35%. The ethnicity of participants was recorded, but not used as the basis for stratification.

Since there are no fixed street addresses in the camps that uniquely identify residences, households within each block were chosen randomly by the following method. First, we used existing data from the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(OCHA), the UNHCR, and tribal leaders to determine the number of households in a given block. Second, we determined how many households needed to be sampled from that block (nblock) to maintain the proper proportional sample. Then a series of nblock numbers between one and the total number of households in that block was drawn (without replacement) from a uniform random distribution. Thus, a series of numbers was generated, with each number corresponding to a household to be sampled in the block in question. The numbers corresponding to these households were recorded on interviewer-assignment sheets and distributed to the interviewers. Each interviewer was carefully trained to “count houses” on their assigned block, beginning from any corner of the block, using a standardized counting method. Interviewers counted households in this way until reaching the assigned randomly produced number.

Once the designated household was identified, the house was approached to determine if any adults were home, and if not, when they might return. If an adult was home, the interviewer determined the total number of adult residents, and one of those adults was selected at random using a sheet that contained random numbers corresponding to different possible household sizes. Within a block, each household was equally likely to be chosen (with the number of households to be chosen proportional to the total population of that block). Since logistical constraints required us to randomize over households in this way rather than on individuals, it warrants mention that individuals living in larger households were slightly less likely to be chosen than those in smaller households. This was unavoidable as we did not have data on the size of each household.

In some cases, the randomly selected individual was not present when the interviewer visited. We sought to minimize, as much as possible, the use of “backup” household selections that would bias the sample towards individuals who were more easily found at home. Thus, when the randomly selected individual was not present, every effort was made to track down that person and arrange a meeting time. The house was also visited again later in the day and on subsequent days while the research team was in that camp (usually three to four days). If the person selected refused to participate or could not be found, only one interview at a backup household was attempted. This backup household was chosen from within the same *sala* (cluster of houses) as the one initially selected, using a randomly generated number. These backup households

were chosen from the same *sala* because households in the same *sala* tend to have similar characteristics (ethnicity, location of origin, time of arrival in the camp, etc.), making these households better substitutes for the initially selected household.

This backup replacement procedure was maintained until the last day of sampling in a given camp. To ensure that camp-wise sampling requirements could be met, on the last day of sampling (after again visiting the original household and the selected within-*sala* backup), interviewers were allowed to use multiple backup households (still within the original *sala*). Alternatively, if on the final day of sampling an individual selected was reported to be in a specified public location outside of the house, a substitute was taken from that location.

For example, if an individual was at the market, an individual of the same ethnicity, gender, and approximate age as the one randomly selected was sought in the market. This was done by estimating the total number of individuals in the market, then choosing a random number between one and the estimated total number. The interviewer then counted individuals from a given corner until arriving at the person corresponding to that number. If the person identified by this process was not of the target age (approximately), gender, and ethnicity, then the next person (counting in the same direction) matching these characteristics was selected. This backup replacement procedure was very rarely necessary, and fewer than 20 respondents were sampled in this fashion.

OVERSAMPLING MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS

There are numerous ethnic groups whose populations in the eastern Chad refugee camps were small, and hence would have been present in our sample only in negligible numbers. This would have made meaningful comparisons across these groups nearly impossible. To address this, we oversampled minority ethnic groups when their populations constituted at least 1% of the refugee population living in eastern Chad. These were the Fur, Misseriya, Jebel, Tama, Erenga, and Dajo.

The Fur were the largest among these minority ethnic groups in the camps, and constitute a significant portion of the population within Darfur. We therefore oversampled the Fur substantially to ensure that we collected an expected 150 surveys. (We expected approximately 50 from the random sample, requiring the collection of roughly an additional 100.) For the other groups, approximately

25 interviews were expected from each group in the random sample, which we increased to 75 each by oversampling.

For each of the ethnic minority groups, almost all of its members typically resided in just two or three different camps. Thus, oversamples for minority ethnic groups were collected in any camp where at least 15% of that group's population was present. When taking oversamples from these camps, the number of people interviewed in each block from a given ethnic minority was proportional to that ethnic group's population in that block. This was calculated on the basis of existing data from the OCHA, updated when possible with local sources of information. The details of this approach had to vary somewhat by camp owing to differences in the availability of information:

1. In the best case, all households of the given ethnicity were identifiable in advance, and then sampled at random.
2. In the second-best cases, household-wise ethnicity information was not available, but it was possible to identify which *salas* contained members of the given ethnic group. Then, random selection of those *salas*, followed by random selection of households within them, was used.
3. Finally, if no household-level or *sala*-level information was available, we chose households randomly from blocks in proportion to the amount of a given ethnic group living in a given block.

In the *sala*-wise or block-wise randomization cases (2 or 3 above), interviewers were again given numbers corresponding to the households they were to find by counting. If the designated household was not a member of the target ethnic group, the next household that did belong to the target group was approached for an interview.

DATA CODING DECISIONS

Decisions on how to code non-standardized responses to open-ended questions were made in a phased process. First, members of the research team read through the responses and formed what appeared to be a nearly (but not entirely) exhaustive list of categories. Then, coders attempted to utilize the coding scheme on approximately 60 surveys on a pilot basis, reporting back on types of responses that did not fit any categories or were difficult to classify. Adjustments were made on the basis of this feedback and coders again coded a (new) batch of 60 surveys, again reporting any difficulties. In general,

we erred on the side of creating more categories than needed, so that data from categories we consider to be very similar could later be merged for presentation purposes.

INTER-RATER RELIABILITY

Each of our coders was first required to reach reliability levels of 85% or higher. To assess reliability, each coder's responses from a batch of data were compared to the "gold standard" responses, which were determined through multiple coding (by seven coders) followed by arbitration by the principal researchers on any points of difference. Any coder not able to achieve an accuracy level of 85% or higher was not used. On questions that allowed multiple responses, coders had to code all the responses correctly for that question to count as having been properly coded. This proved to be a high standard, and was achievable only after improvements were made to our coding scheme and the coding instructions were made extremely detailed, clear, and elaborate.

WEIGHTING

To ensure that our statistics accurately reflect the population of eastern Chad's refugee camps, the data underlying most civilian results presented here were weighted to correct for deviations from population gender and ethnicity proportions. In addition, because of logistical constraints, we occasionally sampled a few percent more or fewer interviewees from a given camp than desired to ensure proportionality. Weights were calculated simply by computing the expected sample proportions of ethnicity by gender given our sample sizes, and dividing these by our actual observed sample proportions for these subgroups.

Thus, men were given a weight of less than 1 to reflect their oversampling, as were ethnic minority groups that were oversampled. Women and groups that were not oversampled received weights greater than 1 to return them to the proper relative weights. Using these weights, the weighted number of observations in each subgroup of gender, ethnicity, and camp is proportional to the size of these groups in the full population. Data on "leaders" was always handled in separate analyses, without weighting.

ENTRY AND TRANSLATION

Survey responses were entered into a computerized database by team members both in the field and after fieldwork was completed. Responses were translated into English as they

were entered. The statistics presented in this report were produced using Matlab and Stata.

CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

The “error bars” shown on many bar graphs indicate the 95% confidence intervals around each estimate. That is, if we were to conduct our survey many times, drawing a fresh sample from the population of interest each time, we expect that 95% of the time the estimated response would fall within the boundaries of this confidence interval. It therefore reflects the degree of variation expected due to chance differences in sampling. These confidence intervals can be helpful in assessing whether the proportion of people giving different responses differs due to a “real” difference rather than random sampling variation.

Consider a question with two possible responses, A or B. If the confidence intervals around estimates A and B do not overlap, then this functions as a conservative indication that the difference between the estimates is different from zero, and would be so in at least 95% of cases if we repeatedly sampled. That is, the underlying response rates can be considered truly different with a high degree of confidence when the confidence intervals do not overlap. Note that the traditional test of whether the proportion giving response A versus those giving response B requires combining the two and their standard deviations into a new estimator, e.g. in the form of a “t-statistic,” whose own confidence interval is derived from a combination of data from A and B. This cannot be conveniently displayed as error bars on a graph. Determining instead whether the confidence intervals of A and B overlap provides a convenient (and conservative) test for whether the difference between estimates is statistically significant beyond the 95% level.

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